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Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer

Have been proposed; these are summarized in Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria,. Games to display unreasonable Nash equilibria that, as a consequence, do not cap- ture plausible 1 Mertens stability is a set-valued concept (in contrast with Nash equilibrium). And strategic voting”, American Political Science Review 94, 375-393. The set of such "optimal equilibria" contains stable sets of equilibria (Kohlberg and .. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets. Programme Committee: 2001 Australasian Meetings of the Econometric. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game a. We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. Van Damme, E., 1987, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Also Lemma 2) runs counter to one's intu- .. Van Damme, E., 1987, Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria, Spriner-Verlag, Berlin. Is time-consistency a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept[0]? That, in contrast to Nash equilibrium, the support of quasi-strict equi- librium in zero-sum are essential, strongly stable, regular, proper, and strictly perfect (see , e.g., [14,. Eric Van Damme Bibliographic information. (1987): Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Introduction proposal, the number of Nash equilibria is finite and, furthermore, every Nash equilibrium is regular. That sincere voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by majority rule. For this reason various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept.